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1Investment under Uncertainty and Policy Change
Abstract
In this paper the impact of policy change on the investment behavior of the ¯rm is
studied. The change occurs when a stochastic process describing the state of the eco-
nomic environment reaches a certain trigger. In our setting both the ¯rm's conjecture
concerning the trigger as well as the precision of this conjecture serve as input param-
eters. We derive the optimal investment rule maximizing the value of the ¯rm. We
show that the impact of trigger value uncertainty is non-monotonic: the investment
threshold decreases with the trigger value uncertainty for low levels of uncertainty,
while the reverse is true for high uncertainty levels. Furthermore, it is shown that
the uncertainty concerning the magnitude of the change delays investment. Finally,
based on the ¯rm's value-maximizing behavior, policy implications for the authority
are presented.
Keywords: investment under uncertainty, real options, policy change
JEL classi¯cation: C61, D81, G31
21 Introduction
Corporate investment opportunities may be represented as a set of (real)
options to acquire productive assets. In the literature it is widely assumed that
the present values of cash °ows generated by these assets are uncertain and
that their evolution can be described by a stochastic process. Consequently,
an appropriate identi¯cation of the optimal exercise strategies for real options
plays a crucial role in capital budgeting and in the maximization of a ¯rm's
value.
So far, the real options literature provides relatively little insight into
the impact of structural changes of the economic environment on the investment
decisions of a ¯rm. The existing papers (excellent surveys of those are provided
by Dixit and Pindyck [5] and by Lander and Pinches [11]) mainly consider
continuous changes in the value of relevant variables. This, most of the time,
results in the assumption that the entire uncertainty in the economy can be
described by a geometric Brownian motion process.
It is often more realistic to model an economic variable as a process
that makes infrequent but discrete jumps.1 In such cases use is made of a
Poisson (jump) process. An interesting application is provided by Hassett and
Metcalf [9] who analyze the impact of an expected reduction in the investment
tax credit.2 In their setting a Poisson process describes the changes in the
tax regime that a®ect the value of the investment opportunity. Within such
a framework an implicit assumption is made that the ¯rm has very limited
information about the mechanisms governing the shocks in the economy.
When a change in the economic environment re°ects a new policy im-
plemented by the authority, it may be more realistic to assume that the ¯rm
has some conjecture about the expected moment of the change. Referring to
the example of the investment tax credit, the ¯rm typically expects the reduc-
tion to be imposed when the economy is booming and an active pro-investment
policy is no longer needed or desired.3 Conversely, applying the Poisson based
methodology is equivalent to assuming that it is time itself and not the state of
economic environment that governs the change.
1For instance, recent tax debates across Europe are a signi¯cant source of uncertainty
associated with discountinuous changes in the economic environment.
2Another, albeitless closely related, reference is Pennings[15] thatprovidesthe example of
optimal ¯scal policy associated with investmentwhen the cash °ows received after completing
the project are uncertain.
3Although some of the changes of tax rates in Europe result from the need to unify the
EU tax systems, in many cases the policy change can be attributed to the pace of economic
growth. After a period of fast economic growth, in 1999 Ireland announced an end to its 10%
corporate tax rate for new foreign manufacturing and ¯nancial investors as one of the means
to avoid "overheating" of the economy. Other EU proposals include abandoning corporate
tax exemptions in Germany and withdrawing approximately seventy tax reliefs used so far
by European governments to draw investment. The tax reliefs subject to change range from
Belgian exemptions on multinational haedquarters to incentives made by Spain for investors
in the Basque region. Cf. "Hey, Let's All Get Together and Raise Taxes!", Businessweek,
25 Nov., 1998 and "Ireland: Burning Too Bright; Can Ireland control its rapid growth?",
Businessweek, 10 Apr., 2000.
3Moreover, the ¯rm (at least to some extent) can assess the precision
of its conjecture concerning the moment of change, i.e. the variance of the
estimate of the timing of the future event. A Poisson based approach does
not allow for including this type of uncertainty in the analysis since it entails a
single parameter characterizing the arrival rate of the jump. Consequently, such
a modelling approach lacks degrees of freedom to capture both the expectation
and the precision of this expectation.4
In this paper, we propose a method to model the impact of a policy
change on the investment strategy of the ¯rm that takes into account the type
of information possessed by the ¯rm while making the investment decision. In
our approach the subjective expectation concerning the moment of the change
as well as the level of imprecision of such a conjecture serve as input parameters.
We model the policy change as being triggered by a su±ciently high realization
of a stochastic process related to the value of the investment opportunity. This,
for instance, re°ects the fact that - as we already argued - a tax credit reduction
is more likely to occur when the economy is booming. Hence, the moment of
the reduction depends on the state of the economy. This is in contrast with
the models based on the Poisson process where the probability of the change is
constant over time.5
There are other economic situations in which it is realistic to impose
a certain relationship between the occurrence of the shock and the state of
the economy. A foreign direct investment decision to purchase a privatized
enterprise where the local government may increase the o®ering price after the
performance of the enterprise improves, can also be perceived as an option with
an embedded risk of an increase in the strike price. A non-exclusive investment
opportunity for which a competitive bid can be expected can serve as another
example.6;7
4It may be more realistic to assume that a ¯rm expects Mr. Greenspan to increase the
interest rate when the DJIA reaches the barrier of 12,000 pts with a precision +/- 500 pts
than to assume that the ¯rm's conjecture about such an event can be expressed with a single
Poisson arrival rate. The latter would mean that the occurrence of an interest rate increase
solely depends on time and the level of uncertainty concerning this event is predetermined by
the arrival rate.
5Hassett and Metcalf [9] try to correctthis by letting the arrival rate depend on the output
price. But still it is then possible that an investment subsidy is reduced for low output prices,
while the subsidy was maintained underhigh output prices. This kind of inconsistency in the
authority's behavior is no longer possible under our approach.
6See Smets [19] and Cherian and Perotti [3] for a discussion of the e®ects of strategic
interactions and political risk.
7The same idea can also be applied within the topic of technology adoption. In Farzin et
al. [6] the arrival of a more e±cient technology satis¯es a Poisson process (this assumption
is also adopted by Baudry [1] where the new technology has the advantage of being less
polluting, and by Mauer and Ott [12] where maintenance and operation cost are lowered after
the technological breakthrough). This way of modeling is satisfactory only when the ¯rm has
no insight at all in the innovation process of new technologies. If, instead, the ¯rm could
observe progress (buthas no perfectinformation), a way to model itis to introduce a variable
that stands for the state of technological progress. The ¯rm is able to observe perfectly the
realizations of this variable. As soon as the state of technological progress hits a certain
barrier, which is ex ante unknown to the ¯rm, the new technology is invented. This approach
is similar to the one in Grenadier and Weiss [7] but there it was assumed that the value of
4We consider the possibility of an upward jump in the (net) investment
cost. This jump is caused, for instance, by the reduction of an investment tax
credit. It occurs at the moment that an underlying variable reaches a certain
trigger. Here, the underlying variable is the value of the investment project. The
¯rm is not aware of the exact value of the trigger but it knows the probability
distribution underlying the trigger. Taking into account consistent authority's
behavior, the ¯rm knows that a jump will not occur as long as the current value
of the variable remains below the maximum that this variable has attained in the
past. When the underlying variable reaches a new maximum and the jump does
still not occur, the ¯rm updates its conjecture about the value of the barrier.
Consequently, our objective is to determine the optimal timing of an
irreversible investment when the investment cost is subject to change and the
¯rm has incomplete information about the moment of the change. It is clear
that the value of the investment opportunity drops to zero at the moment that
the investment cost jumps to in¯nity. However, we mainly consider scenarios
where the cost of investment is still ¯nite after the upward jump occurred. In
this way this work generalizes Lambrecht and Perraudin [10] , Schwartz and
Moon [17], and Berrada [2], where the value of the project drops to zero at the
unknown point of time.
Our main results are the following. An equation is derived that implic-
itly determines the value of the project at which the ¯rm is indi®erent between
investing and refraining from the investment. This value is the optimal invest-
ment threshold and it is shown that this threshold is decreasing in the hazard
rate of the cost-increase trigger. For the most frequently used density functions
it holds that, for a given value of the project, the hazard rate ¯rst increases and
then decreases with trigger value uncertainty. This leads to the conclusion that
the investment threshold decreases with the trigger value uncertainty when the
uncertainty is low, while it increases with uncertainty for high uncertainty lev-
els. Hence, for a policy maker interested in accelerating investment, an optimal
(strictly positive) level of the trigger value uncertainty can be identi¯ed which
is the level corresponding to the minimal investment threshold. Furthermore,
it is shown that the uncertainty concerning the magnitude of the change delays
investment. This implies that an e®ective policy stimulating early investment
is associated with minimizing the investors' uncertainty about the size of the
expected change.
In Section 2 we recall the basic model of investment under uncertainty,
while in Section 3 the investment cost jump resulting from a policy change
is introduced. Section 4 provides the major results and Section 5 contains
a numerical analysis including some comparisons with Poisson based models.
Section 6 extends the model to allow for a stochastic size of the jump in the
cost. In Section 7 we present the implications of our model for the authority
that considers an investment tax credit policy change, and Section 8 concludes.
the barrier is known beforehand.
52 The Basic Model
We start by considering the basic model of investment under uncertainty
developed by McDonald and Siegel [13], and extensively analyzed in Dixit and
Pindyck [5]. The general problem is to ¯nd the optimal timing of an irreversible
investment, I, given that the value of the investment project, fVt : t ¸ 0g,
follows a geometric Brownian motion process
dVt = ®Vtdt+ ¾Vtdwt; (1)
which is de¯ned on the complete ¯ltered probability space (-;F;P;F) satis-
fying the usual hypotheses.8 The parameter ® denotes the deterministic drift
parameter, ¾ is the instantaneous standard deviation, and dw is the increment
of a Wiener process.9 The ¯rm is assumed to be risk-neutral and maximizes
the expected present value of cash °ow by choosing the optimal V at which the
project is undertaken.10 A well-described procedure (see Dixit and Pindyck [5]),
involving the use of It^ o's lemma and solving a di®erential equation under the
corresponding value-matching and smooth-pasting conditions, yields the value




















¾2 > 1; (3)
and r is the instantaneous interest rate.11 For the value of the investment
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where Tm is the ¯rst passage time corresponding to the threshold Vm. By
rearranging 4 we obtain that12









According to (4), there are two factors determining the value of the investment
opportunity. The ¯rst factor, Vm ¡ I, corresponds to the net payo® realized
8Shiryaev [18] providesadetailed exposition of the probabilisticconceptsapplied to¯nance.
9To simplify notation, from now on we skip the time subscripts.
10Risk-neutrality assumption can be replaced by applying the replicating portfolio method-
ology. In order to capture the discountinuous changes of volatility and/or in the value of
investment opportunity resulting from the policy change, we repeat the argument of Naik
[14].
11The problem has a ¯nite solution for ® <r.
12The expectation exists if and only if ® > 1
2¾2.
6at the time of the optimal exercise. The second one, often referred to as a
probability-weighted discount factor, (V=Vm)
¯, allows for translating the future
payo® from the investment opportunity into its present value.
The value of the optimal investment threshold is positively related both
to the volatility of the project's value as well as to its growth rate (the higher
they are, the higher V must be reached for the project to be undertaken). W (V)
increases in the volatility of the value of the project (¯ is a decreasing function
of ¾ and W is decreasing in ¯) which results from the convex payo® of the
investment opportunity. Moreover, W is increasing in the growth rate, ®, since
the e®ective discount rate of future cash °ows decreases linearly in ®.
3 The Model with a Jump in the Investment
Cost
In this section we develop the model that allows for incorporating the im-
pact of the expected policy change on the ¯rm's investment strategy. If the
value of the investment project reaches a critical level, a certain policy instru-
ment is imposed and, as a result, an e®ective increase in the investment cost
occurs.13 This instrument can be interpreted, among others, as a reduction in
the investment tax credit, an increase in the cost of capital via lending rates
or an increase in the o®ering price for a privatized enterprise. Allowing for a
broader interpretation, an arrival of a competitive ¯rm o®ering a higher bid for
a particular project belongs to the set of potential sources of the investment
cost shock as well.
We denote by V ¤ such a realization of the process for which the new
policy is imposed and the investment cost changes from Il to Ih, where Ih > Il.
At this stage we assume that Ih is deterministic. Later we consider Ih to be
stochastic and discuss implications of such an extension. The ¯rm does not know
the value of V ¤ but knows only its cumulative density function, F(V ¤). F(¢) is
continuous and twice di®erentiable everywhere in the interior of its domain. To
provide a simple interpretation, we assume that F (¢) is completely de¯ned by its
¯rst two moments. Moreover, F(¢) is stationary over time. Consequently, if the
investment cost has not increased by time ¿, while V is the highest realization
of the process so far, the cost will not increase at any u > ¿ as long as Vt · V
for all t · u: Hence, the probability of the jump in investment cost is a function
of V alone.
In order to restrict our analysis to the most interesting case, we impose
13If, instead, a downward changeininvestment costisconsidered, the same solution method-
ology can be applied as in the remainder of the paper. Consequently, a unique realization of
the underlying process has to be found for which the marginal cost of waiting beyond the op-
timal investment threshold equalsthe bene¯tof waiting associated with the expected decrease
in the investment cost.















< V ¤ ¡ Il; (iii)
(6)
where V ¤
min and V ¤
max are the lower and higher bound of the domain of F(¢): V0
denotes the initial value of the project and Vh (´ ¯Ih=(¯ ¡ 1)) is the uncondi-
tional optimal investment threshold corresponding to the cost Ih.14 Assump-
tions (i) and (ii) ensure that the problem is relevant, i.e. that the policy change
has not occurred yet and that there is a positive probability that the change
will take place before the optimal threshold corresponding to Il is reached. As-
sumption (iii) states that ex post it is never optimal to wait with investing until
the upward change in cost occurs.
3.1 Value of the Investment Opportunity
Since the value of the project that triggers the increase in the investment
cost is not known beforehand, two scenarios are possible. In the ¯rst scenario the
investment occurs before the change in the investment cost, and in the second
scenario the investment takes place after the upward change. Consequently,
the value of the investment opportunity re°ects the structure of the expected
payo®:
Ws(V;V jI = Il) = ps(V )E
·Z 1
Ts

















where ps(V ) is the conditional (on the highest realization of V, V) probability
that the investment cost will not increase before the investment is made opti-
mally, and Ts and Th denote the ¯rst passage time corresponding to the optimal
investment threshold at the low and at the high cost, respectively. Expectations
of Ts and Th can be calculated in a similar way as (5). After rearranging and in-
cluding these expectations, we obtain the following maximization problem that
allows for ¯nding the optimal investment threshold:




















141B denotes an indicator function of B such that 1B (x) =
½
1 x2 B
0 x = 2 B :
8Vs is the optimal investment threshold in case the investment takes place before
the change in cost, and V is the highest realization of the process so far. Hence,
(1¡ F (Vs))=(1¡F(V)) is the probability that the jump in the investment cost
will not occur by the moment V is equal to Vs, given that the shock has not
occurred for V smaller than V . Equation (8) is therefore interpreted as follows:
the value of the investment opportunity is equal to the weighted average of the
values of two investment opportunities. They correspond to the investment cost
Il and Ih, respectively, given that the investment is made optimally (at Vs if the
cost is still equal to Il and at Vh if the upward change has already occurred).15
The value of the investment opportunity depends on the highest real-
ization of the process, V . A higher V (thus a one closer to Vs) implies a lower
probability of the trigger falling into the interval (V ; Vs) and, as a consequence,
a higher probability of making the investment at the lower cost, Il. In order to
calculate the value of the investment opportunity, we ¯rst need to establish the
value of Vs by solving the maximization problem.
3.2 Optimal Investment Threshold
The optimal investment threshold, Vs, is determined by maximizing the
value of the investment opportunity or the RHS of the Equation (8).
Proposition 1 Under the su±cient condition that
h
0(Vs)Vs + h(Vs) ¸ 0; (11)
the investment is made optimally at Vs which is the solution to the following
equation:
h(Vs)V 2












1¡F (x) denotes the hazard rate.16
15It is worth pointing out that for Ih ! 1 the value of the investment opportunity boils
down to:









which directly correspondsto the resultof Lambrechtand Perraudin [10]. In the otherlimiting
case, i.e. for Ih !Il, the value of investment opportunity converges to






which is the formula obtained by McDonald and Siegel [13].
16In ourcase,the hazardratehasthe followinginterpretation. The probabilityoftheupward
change in the investment cost during the nearest increment of the value of the project, dV ,
(given that the cost-increase has notoccurred by now) is equal to the appropriate hazard rate
multiplied by the size of the value increment, i.e. to h(x;¢)dV.
9Proof. See Appendix.
A su±cient condition for (11) to hold is that the hazard rate has to be
non-decreasing.17 Condition (11) is satis¯ed for most of the common density
functions as, e.g., exponential, uniform and Pareto.18
4 Solution Characteristics
In this section we analyze the sensitivity of the optimal threshold with
respect to changes in the parameters characterizing the dynamics of the project
value. Moreover, we determine the direction of the impact of the changes in the
investment costs under both policy regimes. Subsequently, we examine how the
uncertainty concerning the moment of imposing the change in°uences the ¯rm's
optimal investment rule.
4.1 Changing the Parameters of the Investment Opportu-
nity
We are interested in how potential changes in the characteristics of the
investment opportunity in°uence the optimal investment rule. For this purpose
we formulate the following proposition.
Proposition 2 The e®ects on the investment threshold level of the changes in










8Il;Ih satisfying 0 < Il < Ih; 8¯ 2 (1;r=®) if ® > 0 and 8¯ 2 (1;1) if ® · 0:
Proof. See Appendix.
Consequently, the optimal threshold (ceteris paribus) increases in the
initial investment cost and decreases in the size of the potential cost-increase as
well as in the parameter ¯. The latter implies that the threshold increases with
uncertainty of the value of the project and decreases with the wedge between
interest rate and the project's growth rate. All these results are intuitively
plausible.
17More precisely, the elasticity of the hazard rate with respect to the value of the process
evaluated at the optimal investment threshold has to be larger than ¡1.
18In fact, the hazard rate based on the Pareto function is decreasing at the order of 1=x
and the property (11) is still met.
104.2 Impact of Policy Change
The optimal investment rule depends not only on the characteristics of the
project itself but also on the ¯rm's conjecture about the probability distribution
underlying the expected policy change. The parameters of this distribution can
be in°uenced by actions of the authority. For instance, an information campaign
about the expected changes in the investment tax credit leads to a reduction of
the variance (often to zero) of the distribution underlying the value triggering
the change. Therefore, it is important to know how changes in the uncertainty
related to the project value triggering the jump in the investment cost in°uence
the ¯rm's optimal investment rule. Knowing that the ¯rms are going to act
optimally, the authority can implement a desired policy, which is, for instance,
accelerating the investment expenditure, by changing the level of the ¯rms'
uncertainty about the tax strategy. We come back to this point in Section 7,
where policy implications for the authority are considered.
4.2.1 Hazard Rate
The hazard rate of the arrival of the cost-increase trigger is one of the
basic inputs for calculating the optimal investment threshold. Although it is
exogenous to the ¯rm, it may well be controlled by another party such as the
authority. Here, we determine the impact of its change on the ¯rm's investment
rule. Later, we discuss some of the policy implications of the obtained result.
After applying the envelope theorem to the LHS of (12), we can formu-
late the following proposition.
Proposition 3 The optimal investment threshold is decreasing in the corre-









This result implies that an increasing risk of the jump leads to an earlier
optimal exercise. The intuition is quite simple: an increasing probability of a
partial deterioration of the investment opportunity after a small appreciation
in the project value decreases the value of waiting. Consequently, (16) implies
that for any parameter of the density function underlying the jump, denoted by













Using (17) we can establish how the investment threshold is a®ected by changes
in the parameters of the distribution function underlying the occurrence of the
jump.
114.2.2 Trigger Value Uncertainty
Now the aim is to analyze how the optimal investment threshold is a®ected
by uncertainty related to the value of the cost-increase trigger. To do so, we
only need to establish the sign of the relationship between the hazard rate and
the uncertainty related to the value of the trigger. We measure the trigger-value
uncertainty by applying a mean-preserving spread (see Rotschild and Stiglitz
[16])
If the cost-increase trigger is known with certainty, the investment is
made optimally at an in¯nitesimal instant before V ¤ is reached. At this point,
the hazard rate is zero (there is no risk that the cost increases before the optimal
threshold is reached). As the uncertainty marginally increases, the hazard rate is
a®ected by: 1) the value of the density function underlying the trigger, denoted
by f(V ¤), and 2) a change in the value of the survival function, 1 ¡ F (V ¤).
It is easy to verify that, for the most frequently used density functions, such
as normal, uniform, exponential and Pareto, the value of the hazard rate, for
any V 2 [V0;E [V ¤]), ¯rst increases and then decreases in the mean-preserving
spread. An example for the normal density function is shown in Figure 1.19






















Figure 1. The relationship between the hazard rate and standard deviation of a
normal density function N
¡
150;!2¢
. Hazard rates are plotted for V = 100, 120 and
140.
Moreover, for each degree of the trigger value uncertainty, there exists
such a value of V < E [V ¤], say e V , that for V 2 [V0; e V ) the hazard rate in-
creases, and for V 2 (e V;E [V ¤]) decreases, in this uncertainty. This form of the
relationship between the hazard rate and the uncertainty implies (via Proposi-
tion 3) that Vs decreases in the uncertainty if it falls into the interval [V0; e V)
and increases otherwise, as depicted in Figure 2.
19Although the concepts of the mean-preserving spread and increased standard deviation
are, in general, not equivalent, they may be treated as such for the types of density functions
referred to in this paper.
12Vs decreases Vs increases
in uncertainty e V in uncertainty
V
Figure 2
Figure 2. The relationship between trigger value uncertainty and the optimal
investment threshold.
Consequently, in order to determine the sign of the e®ect of uncertainty
on Vs, we need to establish the relative position of Vs with respect to e V . Let
us denote the standard deviation of the density function underlying the cost-
increase trigger by !. Since the expression for Vs is already known (see (12)),
all we have to calculate is e V as a function of !, such that, for each pair (V;!),









For the most frequently used density functions it can be shown that e V decreases
with uncertainty. For a relatively low degree of uncertainty, it holds that Vs < e V
(< E[V ¤]). Since for V < e V the hazard rate increases in !, Vs falls when the
uncertainty rises. After the uncertainty reaches a critical level, say !e, at which
Vs = e V ; the hazard rate at Vs decreases in ! and the optimal threshold begins to
increase. This implies that optimal investment threshold attains the minimum
for ! = !e. Now, we are able to formulate the following proposition.
Proposition 4 Consider the following unrestrictive conditions
lim
!!1
f(V;¢) = 0; 8V and
f(V;¢) is unimodal,
(19)
Then, there exists a non-monotonic relationship between the optimal investment
threshold and the trigger value uncertainty. At a low degree of uncertainty, the
marginal increase in uncertainty leads to an earlier optimal investment. The
reverse is true for a high degree of uncertainty. There exists a unique !e, such
that Vs(!e) = e V (!e); which separates the areas of low and high uncertainty
levels.
Proof. Proposition 4 directly follows from the analysis performed so far.
20Although e V(!) cannotbe written explicitly in a general form, its valuescorresponding to
a given density function may be easily found numerically.
13The interpretation of the proposition is relatively simple. At low levels
of uncertainty concerning the policy change the ¯rm responds to an increase of
this uncertainty by investing earlier (i.e. at a lower V). This is because the
chance of earlier implementation of a new instrument increases. However, when
this uncertainty becomes su±ciently high, the ¯rm is more willing to ignore the
information about the expected change since the quality of this information has
deteriorated too much. The marginal impacts of a higher probability of an early
change and of the increased "noisiness" of the ¯rm's conjecture o®set exactly at
the level of uncertainty equal to !e:
Figures 3 and 4 show the relationship between the uncertainty, !, and
the optimal investment threshold.


















Figure 3. The relationship between the uncertainty, !, and the optimal investment
threshold, Vs, for di®erent sizes of the high investment cost (Ih = 120;150 and 200).
The values are calculated for a normal density function with mean 150. The original
investmentcost, Il equals 100. An intersectionof Vs and e V correspondsto the minimal
investment threshold, Vs(!e). The parameters of the underlying process are: ® = 0;
r = 0:025 and ¾ = 0:1:21
In Figure 3 it can be seen that the optimal investment threshold is
¯rst decreasing and then increasing in the uncertainty concerning the value of
the trigger. The minimum is always reached when Vs(!) intersects e V(!). The
hazard rate increases in ! in the area located to the south-west from e V (!) and
decreases in the north-eastern region. The opposite holds for Vs. Moreover,
the optimal threshold is higher if the expected change in the investment cost is
smaller (cf. Proposition 2).
21This set of parameters is used in Dixit [4], and Lambrecht and Perraudin [10] (we rescale
the investment cost with the factor 100).

























Figure 4. The relationship between V and the derivative of the hazard rate with re-
spect to the trigger value uncertainty. The optimal investment thresholds for Ih = 150
and di®erent uncertainty levels are shown on the horizontal axis (Point a corresponds
to Vs(15), b to Vs(!e = 19:26) and c to Vs(25): The values are calculated for a
normal density function with mean 150. The parameters of the underlying process
are: ® = 0; r = 0:025 and ¾ = 0:1:
In Figure 4 it can be noticed that the point, e V , at which the derivative
of the hazard rate is equal to zero moves to the left when the trigger uncertainty
increases. As long as Vs < e V, the optimal threshold also moves to the left (cf.
the location of Vs(15)). When the standard deviation is equal to !e = 19:26,
Vs equals e V . After a further increase in the uncertainty, e V continues moving to
the left and Vs starts moving to the right (cf. Vs(25)). For a su±ciently high
degree of uncertainty Vs tends to the unconditional threshold, denoted by Vl
(´ ¯Ih=(¯ ¡ 1)):22
5 Comparative Statics
In this section we provide a numerical illustration of the results of our
model. In Table 1 the relationship between the uncertainty about the timing of
the jump in the investment cost and the optimal investment threshold is shown
for di®erent levels of the after-shock investment cost. The results are grouped
in three panels corresponding to the di®erent combinations of the rate of growth
and volatility of the project's value.
22The necessary and su±cient condition for lim
!!1
Vs = Vl is lim
!!1
h(Vs;¢)= 0:
15E [V ¤] = 160 Vs
Ih ! 100 50 25 10 5
110 186:48 177:91 169:62 162:32 159:57
125 176:96 166:88 158:90 153:95 154:10
150 169:02 158:64 151:65 149:62 151:99
200 161:85 151:68 145:98 146:76 150:71
500 152:76 143:32 139:64 143:93 149:47
1 148:22 N OW N OW 142:74 148:94
Vl = 200 ® = 0:02 ¾ = 0:1 r = 0:05
110 153:41 150:18 147:36 147:40 150:42
125 149:08 144:74 142:11 144:45 149:04
150 145:39 140:59 138:53 142:69 148:25
200 142:21 N OW N OW 141:45 147:69
500 N OW N OW N OW 140:35 147:20
1 N OW N OW N OW 140:11 147:10
Vl = 158:77 ® = 0:01 ¾ = 0:1 r = 0:05
110 302:09 281:54 271:10 302:07 302:07
125 270:82 248:50 236:21 230:52 201:37
150 246:79 223:99 210:45 203:01 201:22
200 225:19 202:79 188:74 179:47 176:70
500 194:54 174:42 162:24 155:32 154:80
1 160:54 145:73 140:46 144:60 149:97
Vl = 371:85 ® = 0:02 ¾ = 0:3 r = 0:05
Table 1. The optimal investment thresholds calculated for three di®erent com-
binations of the rate of growth and volatility of the project's value. NOW means
that investment takes place immediately. The results are presented for the following
parameter values: investment cost before the jump Il = 100; investment cost after
the jump ranging from 110 to in¯nity, uncertainty concerning the occurrence of the
shock, !, ranging from 5 to 100. The initial value of the process equals V0 = 140.
The results indicate a clear non-monotonic dependence of the optimal
investment threshold on the uncertainty related to the occurrence of the shock.
For example, consider the case where ® = 0:02 and ¾ = 0:1: When the ¯rm's con-
jecture about the expected occurrence of the shock is relatively precise (! = 5),
the possibility of doubling the e®ective investment cost results in the expected
timing of undertaking the project being equal to 4.91 years.23 When the un-
certainty concerning the occurrence of the jump becomes moderately higher
(! = 25), the ¯rms is expected to invest within 2.78 years. Finally, when the
¯rm's conjecture about the moment of the shock is highly imprecise (! = 100),









16the expected time to invest equals 9.67 years. If the project is about to de-
teriorate completely after the shock in the economy, the expected timing of
investment shortens signi¯cantly, especially if the uncertainty concerning the
occurrence of the shock is high. For ! = 5 it is equal to 4.13 years, and for
! = 25 it is optimal to invest immediately. In the case corresponding to a very
high imprecision of the conjecture (! = 100) the expected time to invest equals
3.80 years. The direction of the impact of change in the growth rate and/or
volatility of the project's value is consistent with the conclusions in the existing
real options literature.
In Table 2 we show the values corresponding to the investment oppor-
tunity and probabilities that the investment is made before the increase in the
investment cost (provided that the cost still equals Il at V0).
E [V ¤] = 160 W (V );P (Vs < V ¤jV ¤ > V0)
Ih ! 100 50 25 10 5
110 61:54 66:65 70:58 71:24 66:00
0:68 0:55 0:44 0:42 0:53
125 55:82 57:11 56:94 53:25 48:66
0:75 0:68 0:66 0:74 0:88
150 50:93 50:01 48:28 46:28 45:27
0:80 0:78 0:80 0:87 0:95
200 46:69 44:70 42:93 43:01 43:92
0:85 0:86 0:90 0:93 0:97
500 42:16 40:51 40:00 40:86 42:98
0:91 0:96 1:00 0:97 0:98
1 40:62 40:00 40:00 40:30 42:66
0:94 1:00 1:00 0:98 0:97
Vl = 200 ® = 0:02 ¾ = 0:1 r = 0:05
Table 2. The values of the investment opportunity and probabilities of investing
at Il for the following parameter values: investment cost before the jump Il = 100;
investment cost after the jump ranging from 110 to in¯nity, uncertainty concerning
the occurrence of the shock ranging from 5 to 100. The initial value of the process
equals V0 = V = 140.
From Table 2 it can be concluded that increasing the magnitude of
the change in the investment cost results in i) deteriorating the value of the
investment opportunity, and ii) an increased probability of investing before the
shock occurs (which is a direct consequence of the lower optimal threshold).
An interesting observation can be made upon analyzing the relationship
between the trigger-value uncertainty and the value of the investment oppor-
tunity. The non-monotonicity of this relationship results from the interaction
of two opposite e®ects. First, increasing the variance, !, implies lower quality
of the ¯rm's information about the moment of the policy change. This factor
a®ects the value of the investment opportunity negatively. On the other hand,
17higher uncertainty makes the ¯rm update its beliefs about the distribution of
V ¤ in a way that enhances the value of the investment opportunity (the prob-
ability of survival on the interval [V0;Vs] becomes higher).24 It appears that in
situations where the magnitude of the change in the investment cost is small,
the value of the project is the highest for a moderate precision of the conjecture
about the timing of the change. Conversely, if the investment opportunity is
to deteriorate completely upon the occurrence of the shock, the value of the
project is most likely to be equal to its static NPV, i.e. the value of the project
minus investment cost, for a moderate precision of the conjecture.
To provide some intuition of how the results of our model correspond to
the outcome of Poisson based models, in which the whole information about the
shock is aggregated in a single arrival parameter, we present some comparative
statics comparing both approaches in Table 3.25
Vl = 200:00 Ih = 150




! (¸) Vs (! (¸))
0:01 627:44 191:64 100 1031:90 196:61
0:05 188:98 172:25 20 56:91 166:49
0:10 162:66 161:11 10 24:42 152:51
0:25 148:66 148:48 4 8:92 142:49
0:33 146:51 145:47 3 6:66 140:98
0:50 144:26 141:67 2 4:33 N OW
® = 0:02 ¾ = 0:1 r = 0:05
Table 3. The optimal investment thresholds based on the model with the policy
change triggered by V ¤ compared with the outcomes of the Poisson based model with
the arrival rate ¸ ranging from 0:01 to 0:50 where the initial value of the process
equals V0 = 140: ! (¸) is a geometric average of an upward and downward deviation
from E [V ¤]; that are associated with the expected ¯rst passage time
1
¸.26
In Table 3 E [V ¤] is selected in such a way that its expected ¯rst pas-
sage time is equal to the expected time of a Poisson jump of a given arrival rate.
Moreover, the level of uncertainty concerning the cost-increase trigger corre-
sponds to the standard deviation of the trigger implied by the Poisson process.
24The positive impact of updating on the value of the investment opportunity results from
the fact that conditional on V ¤ > V0 the cumulative density function of V ¤ is decreasing in
! for su±ciently large !: This is equivalent, by de¯nition, to the increase of the value of the
conditional survival function.
25In order to calculate the optimal thresholds based on the Poisson arrivals, we apply a
similar methodology as Dixit and Pindyck [5], pp. 305-306.
26Consequently, !(¸) is de¯ned as
!(¸) ´ E
q ¡
E[V ¤]¡ V sd¡¢¡
V sd+ ¡E[V ¤]
¢
;
where V sd+ (V sd¡) is the upward (downward) deviation from E[V ¤] such that the expected
¯rst-passage time of reaching V sd+ (E[V ¤]) when the process originates at E[V ¤] (V sd¡)
equals 1
¸:
18It appears that the slope of the relationship between the cost-increase trigger
uncertainty and the optimal investment threshold is higher when our model is
used than in the Poisson based approach. In other words, the resulting invest-
ment thresholds will be more responsive to the changes in !. Consequently, for
high levels of cost-increase trigger uncertainty, the optimal investment threshold
under our approach will be higher than for Poisson based models (a cost increase
trigger combined with very noisy information will not have a substantial e®ect
on the ¯rm's investment behavior). Conversely, if the prediction of the policy
change is more reliable, the ¯rm will invest more carefully (therefore earlier).
Finally, in Table 4 we show the outcomes of the Poisson based model in
which the arrival rate is positively related to the value of the project.
Vl = 200:00 ¸V arjV =VPVar = ¸ ¸V arjV =V0 = ¸
¸ E [V ¤] VP d VPV ar d VPV ar
0:01 627:44 191:64 5:195 £ 10¡5 192:52 7:143 £ 10¡5 190:20
0:05 188:98 172:75 2:875 £ 10¡4 173:71 3:511 £ 10¡4 170:69
0:10 162:66 161:11 6:160 £ 10¡4 162:49 7:143 £ 10¡4 160:33
0:25 148:66 148:48 1:675 £ 10¡3 149:24 1:178 £ 10¡3 148:53
0:33 146:51 145:47 2:284 £ 10¡3 145:96 2:357 £ 10¡3 145:64
0:50 144:26 141:67 3:520 £ 10¡3 142:07 3:571 £ 10¡3 141:95
® = 0:02 ¾ = 0:1 r = 0:05
Table 4. The optimal investment threshold calculated according to the Poisson
based model with a variable arrival rate. The initial value of the process equals V0 =
140, and the investment cost after the jump is given by Ih = 150: Parameter d
corresponding to the variable arrival rate ¸ = V d is a solution to ¸ = VPV ard in
column 4 and ¸ = V0d in column 6, while the relevant ¸ is presented in column 1.
Table 4 illustrates the impact on the optimal investment threshold of in-
troducing a variable arrival rate. The arrival rate increases with the value of the
project. For the ¯rst set of solutions (columns 4-5) the variable ¸(V ) equals ¸ in
column 1 exactly at the level of V triggering the investment, i.e. ¸(VPV ar) = ¸.
Analogously, the second set of solutions (columns 5-6) correspond to such a nor-
malization upon which the variable rate ¸(V ) equals to a constant ¸ in column
1 at V0. Despite the fact that the variable ¸ has been normalized in two extreme
ways, the di®erences in outcomes are relatively small. Therefore, we conclude
that an attempt to introduce a variable arrival rate in the Poisson-based model
does not alter the ¯rm's investment behavior signi¯cantly.
6 Extension: Stochastic Jump Size
In this section we relax the assumption that the magnitude of the change in
the investment cost is known beforehand. The ¯rm is assumed to know only the
density function of the size of the jump. Consequently, the random variable Ih
19is distributed according to the cumulative density function G(Ih) with a support £
Ih;Ih
¤









that ensures that the ¯rm prefers incurring the cost Il to spending the stochastic
amount Ih.27
Like in the deterministic case, the value of the investment opportunity,
Ws, re°ects the structure of the expected payo®s maximized with respect to the
optimal investment threshold, Vs. For stochastic Ih, the value of investment
opportunity becomes (cf. (8)):



















1¡ F (V )
!
dG (Ih): (21)
Equation (21) is interpreted analogously to (8), and the second component is the
expected value of the option to invest after the upward change in the investment
cost occurs. We prove in the Appendix that the following proposition holds.
Proposition 5 In case of a stochastic size of the jump in the investment cost,













in expression (12) for the optimal threshold.
Formula (22) can be interpreted as a certainty equivalent of the high
investment cost.28. In other words, the investment policy of the ¯rms is identical
in the following two cases: i) investment cost Ih is stochastic and distributed
according to G(Ih) ; and ii) Ih is deterministic and equal to I¤
h. This allows for
a relatively simple analysis of the impact on the optimal investment timing of
the uncertainty concerning the magnitude of the jump.
The impact of the uncertainty concerning the magnitude of the jump
can be analyzed by directly comparing (12) and (14). By Jensen's inequality it
27The LHS of (20) has a natural interpretation presented in the remainder of the section.
28Using the term certainty equivalent isa simpli¯cation since the ¯rm is assumed tobe risk-
neutral. In our sense, (22) corresponds to such a value of a certain investment cost (within
the high regime) that yields an identical optimal investment rule as when uncertain costs are












since the function f(x) = xa;a < 0; is convex for all x > 0. The RHS of
Equation (23) is an inversely monotonic transformation of the expected value
of Ih. Since, by (14), @Vs
@Ih < 0; the threshold increases in I
1¡¯
h : Consequently,
the threshold is higher for LHS than for RHS.
This result can be explained in the following way. The optimal timing
is a convex function of the new investment cost, Ih. Therefore, the gains from
below average realizations of the jump are assigned a larger weight by the ¯rm
than the symmetric losses resulting from above-average realizations. Conse-
quently, the ¯rm is going to wait longer if the realizations are random than in
the case when all of them are equal to the average.
Compared to the basic model where investment cost is constant, the
threat of an upward change in the investment cost reduces the optimal invest-
ment threshold. Now, we can see that the uncertainty in the size of the jump
mitigates this reduction of the threshold value. Again, it holds that increased
uncertainty raises the option value of waiting.
Apart from the overall di®erence between the uncertain and determin-
istic outcome, we are interested in the marginal impact of uncertainty on the
optimal investment strategy. In other words, we aim at establishing how the
investment threshold behaves for di®erent degrees of uncertainty concerning the
size of the jump. Therefore, we compare the investment triggers corresponding
to a relatively small and a high degree of uncertainty. For this purpose, we
use the concept of mean preserving spread (Rotschild and Stiglitz [16]). In this
setting, the e®ect of increasing uncertainty is examined by replacing the original
random variable Ih ('low uncertainty' case) by a new random variable Ih + »
('high uncertainty' case), where E[»] = 0 and ¾» 2 (0;1): By applying Jensen's
inequality it can be proven that the expected value of a convex function (in
our case f(Ih) = I
1¡¯
h ) increases as its argument undergoes a mean preserving
spread (cf. Hartman [8]). Consequently, an increase in the uncertainty leads
to the higher expected value of I
1¡¯
h which corresponds to the lower I¤
h. This
observation results in the following corollary.
Corollary 6 Increasing the uncertainty concerning the magnitude of the jump
of the investment cost (in a mean-preserving spread sense) leads to a higher opti-
mal investment threshold and is equivalent to decreasing the expected magnitude
of the jump.
The impact on the optimal investment rule of uncertainty related to the
magnitude of the change in the cost is monotonic. Furthermore, (13) implies
that a lower potential increase in the investment cost is associated with a higher
21optimal investment threshold. In Table 5 we present the numerical results il-
lustrating the impact of the uncertainty related to the magnitude of the change
on the optimal investment threshold.
V ¤ = 160 Vs
Ih Ih ! 100 50 25 10 5
150 150 169:02 158:64 151:65 149:62 151:99
125 175 169:34 158:96 151:92 149:76 152:06
100 200 170:39 160:02 152:83 150:26 152:29
50 250 177:29 167:25 159:23 154:18 154:21
25 275 192:81 186:54 179:08 171:64 168:60
Vl = 200 ® = 0:02 ¾ = 0:1 r = 0:05
Table 5. The impact of the uncertainty concerning the magnitude of the change
in the investment cost on the optimal investment threshold.
The numerical results in Table 5 illustrate that a higher degree of un-
certainty associated with the magnitude of the potential cost-increase results in
a later investment (the ¯rst row of Table 5 corresponds to the third row of Table
1). Therefore, in the investment credit example, increasing this type of uncer-
tainty has the same e®ect on the investment as the reduction of the magnitude
of the change.
7 Implications for the Investment Credit Tax
Policy Change
In our setting, the way in which the policy change is implemented by the





. Consequently, as a result
of the policy change, the investment cost is subject to increase by a proportion
Ih
Il . The increase is triggered by the project's value reaching the level V ¤ and !
corresponds to the precision of the ¯rm's conjecture concerning the moment of
change. To simplify the example we assume that the ratio
Ih
Il is predetermined
by the current amount of the tax credit (and is a priori common knowledge).
The variables V ¤ and ! are the authority's decision variables.
As we already know, in case of a single ¯rm whose investment oppor-
tunity satis¯es (6), a decrease in a deterministic V ¤ results in a lower optimal
threshold. Consequently, a reduction in the trigger value is going to accelerate
this ¯rm's investment. However, in case of multiple heterogenous ¯rms, low-
ering the trigger has two opposite e®ects. First, as in the single-¯rm case, it
leads to an earlier investment for those ¯rms for which Assumption iii (6) is
still satis¯ed. On the other hand, it results in the other ¯rms waiting longer and
investing at a high cost (i.e. those ¯rms for which Assumption iii (6)) does not
hold). Therefore, if the ¯rms are su±ciently heterogenous, reducing V ¤ does
not yield the desired e®ect of accelerating aggregate investment.
22Therefore, the authority may prefer to resort to another instrument,
such as !. From Proposition 4 it can be concluded that there exists a U-shaped
relationship between ! and the optimal threshold, Vs. An appropriately de-
signed threat of abandoning the tax credit can accelerate investment by lowering
the optimal threshold (see Dixit and Pindyck [5], Ch. 9). Since Vs reaches a
minimum for a certain (strictly positive) degree of uncertainty, !e, the optimal
strategy of the authority interested in accelerating the investment is to gener-
ate su±ciently (but not excessively) imprecise information about the conditions
triggering the change. In purely analytical terms, this corresponds to setting the
standard deviation of the density function associated with the conjecture about
the policy change trigger, F (V ¤), to !e. Such a policy, while still accelerating
investment, allows for Assumption iii (6) to be satis¯ed for a larger fraction of
¯rms than in case of a reduction of a known V ¤.
Since ¯nding the true value of !e can be di±cult in practice, we brie°y
discuss the impact on the investment behavior of misspecifying the optimal
!. A small deviation from !e results in a small relative delay in investment.
Consequently, it is still desirable for the authority to create informational noise.
However, if the misspeci¯cation of !e is large, it can happen that the resulting
optimal investment threshold, Vs, is higher than the threshold corresponding
to the case where V ¤ is known to the ¯rm. Consequently, then the authority
is better o® by revealing the value of V ¤ to the investing ¯rm. It is possible
to ¯nd a critical level of !, de¯ned as !, above which the optimal threshold is
greater than the one corresponding to the known V ¤. According to Proposition
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If it is assumed that increasing the uncertainty by the authority is equiv-
alent to applying a mean preserving spread, the change in the optimal invest-
ment threshold at ! is discontinuous. Since the mean preserving spread implies
that a policy change occurs at V ¤ = E[V ¤]; imposing the level of uncertainty
! > ! results in the investment being made after the change in the cost occurs,
i.e. at Vh (À Vs). Therefore, increasing ! beyond ! leads to a considerable
delay of the investment.30
Consequently, the level of uncertainty concerning the value of the policy
29Equation (24) is also satis¯ed for ! = 0, since the optimal threshold in the deterministic
case is equal to V ¤.
30The expected delay, ¢T, can be calculated from a direct application of the ¯rst passage










[0;!)n!e : feasible (suboptimal) level of uncertainty,
!e : optimal level of uncertainty,
[!;1) : excess uncertainty resulting in an investment delay.
The threat of the policy change accelerates investment most signi¯cantly if the
degree of uncertainty concerning the moment of the change is equal to !e.
Therefore, from the point of view of the authority, this is the optimal level
of the trigger value uncertainty. Revealing the value of V ¤ by the authority
(! = 0) makes the ¯rm invest an instant before V ¤ is reached. Excessive un-
certainty (above !) implies that information concerning the policy change is
too unreliable to trigger investment before V ¤ is hit. As an e®ect, the opti-
mal investment threshold exceeds the threshold corresponding to the known
V ¤: Consequently, there exists a set of feasible, though suboptimal, levels of
uncertainty ! 2 [0;!)n!e for which the optimal investment threshold is lower
than V ¤. For this set the threat of change remains high enough to trigger early
investment.
The implications related to uncertainty in the magnitude of the policy
change are straightforward, thus not requiring additional analysis. As shown in
Section 7, an increase in the uncertainty concerning the magnitude of the change
leads to a delay of the moment of investment. Consequently, ensuring that the
magnitude of the policy change is known beforehand to potential investors lies
in the interest of the authority interested in accelerating investment.
8 Conclusions
In the paper we consider an investment opportunity of a ¯rm. The in-
vestment cost is irreversible and subject to an increase resulting from a policy
change. The value of the cost-increase trigger is unknown to the ¯rm and the
¯rm knows the underlying density function instead. This corresponds to the
situation where the ¯rm has some information concerning the authority's future
policy and this information is incomplete. Moreover, it is taken into account
that a policy change mainly occurs under certain economic conditions.
We show that the threat of a policy change resulting in a higher invest-
ment cost leads to a reduction in the option value of waiting. Consequently, the
¯rm invests earlier than in the case of a constant investment cost. The optimal
investment threshold decreases in the magnitude of the change in investment
cost and increases in market volatility (the latter result also hold for the Dixit
and Pindyck [5] framework). One of our main results is that the impact of trig-
ger value uncertainty on the optimal investment threshold is non-monotonic. If
the uncertainty is su±ciently low, then the investment threshold is negatively
related to the trigger value uncertainty. However, a rise in the uncertainty be-
yond a certain critical point reverses this relationship and leads to an increase
of the optimal investment threshold.
24Moreover, we extend the analysis by considering the case where the
magnitude of the change is stochastic. This additional source of uncertainty
results in a delay of investment. Increasing the uncertainty concerning the
magnitude of the change leads to an outcome that is closer to the unconditional
optimal threshold.
We apply our results to determine the optimal design of a change in
the authority's policy, where the authority's aim is to accelerate investment
undertaken by the ¯rm. There exists a certain (strictly positive) level of the
uncertainty concerning the policy change trigger that is associated with the
earliest investment. Hence, a policy maker interested in accelerating investment
should aim at achieving that particular level of uncertainty. In addition, in
order to stimulate the ¯rm to invest early, the authority should make sure that
the magnitude of the policy change is known beforehand to potential investors.
9 Appendix
Proof of Proposition 1. The implicit solution for the optimal investment
threshold is found by calculating the ¯rst order condition of (8). Consequently,
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1 ¡ F(Vs)
1 ¡ F (V )













1 ¡ F(V )
; (25)
where f (x) =
@F (x)

























h (Vs) = 0:
Since Vh =
¯
¯¡1Ih (after the jump the McDonald-Siegel problem is left), this is
equal to
h (Vs) V 2









what in a straightforward way leads to (12).
25In order to prove that (12) is the expression for the maximal value of the
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¡ (¯ ¡ 1): (26)

















The sign of the ¯rst component can be determined by notifying that the
lower bound of Vs; denoted by Vs, is a solution to the following equation:






For Vs = Vs the second factor in the ¯rst component of (26) is equal to zero
and for Vs > Vs it is positive. Therefore the whole expression is surely negative
if (11) holds.














Di®erentiating (29) with respect to Il; Ih and ¯, respectively, yields:
@H
@Il
= ¡(Vsh(Vs) + ¯) < 0;
@H
@Ih






























268Il;Ih satisfying 0 < Il < Ih; 8¯ 2 (1;r=®) if ® > 0 and 8¯ 2 (1;1) if ® · 0:





















+ (¯ ¡ 1):
From the proof of Proposition 1 it is known that under condition (11) @H
@Vs is

















what completes the proof.
Proof of Proposition 3. By di®erentiating (29) with respect to the












The inequality holds since the both factors are positive (cf. (28) and the proof of
(31)). Since @H
@Vs is also positive, from the envelope theorem we directly obtain
the sign of (16).
Proof of Proposition 5. Equation (22) requires the optimal investment
threshold with a deterministic size of the jump be equal to the threshold with a
jump with a stochastic size distributed according to G(Ih): Since the maximiza-
tion problem with a stochastic size of the jump can be expressed as follows:
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h dG (Ih) : (38)
what in a straightforward way leads to (22).
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